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Abstract
We consider a many-sorted variant of Japaridze’s polymodal provability logic GLP. In
this variant, propositional variables are assigned sorts n < ω, where variables of sort n are
arithmetically interpreted as Πn+1-sentences of the arithmetical hierarchy. We prove that
the many-sorted variant is arithmetically complete with respect to this interpretation.
Keywords: provability logics, mathematical logic, modal logic, formal arithmetic, arith-
metical completeness
1 Introduction
The polymodal provability logic GLP, due to Japaridze [15], has received considerable interest
in the mathematical-logic community. For every n ≥ 0, the language of GLP features modalities
〈n〉 that can be arithmetically interpreted as n-consistency, i.e., a modal formula 〈n〉ϕ expresses
under this interpretation that ϕ is consistent with the set of all true Πn-sentences. This particular
interpretation steered interest in GLP in mainstream proof theory: Beklemishev [3] showed how
GLP can act as a framework in order to canonically recover an ordinal notation system for Peano
arithmetic (PA) and its fragments. Moreover, based on these notions, he obtained a rather
abstract version of Gentzen’s consistency proof for PA by transfinite induction up to ε0 and he
formulated a combinatorial statement independent from PA [5].
This proof-theoretic analysis is based on the notion of graded provability algebra. Let T be
an extension of PA and LT be an algebra whose elements are equivalence classes of the relation
ϕ ∼ ψ ⇐⇒df T ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ.
Furthermore, let {ϕ} denote the equivalence class of ϕ with respect to ∼. Equipping LT with
the standard Boolean connectives and the relation
{ϕ} ≤ {ψ} ⇐⇒df T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
∗This work was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grants Y698 and W1255-N23. The
article is currently under review for publication in the Logic Journal of the IGPL.
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turns LT into a Boolean algebra, the Lindenbaum algebra of T . Thus, logical notions are brought
into an algebraic setting. The maximal element ⊤ and the minimal element ⊥ of this algebra
are, respectively, the classes of all provable and all refutable sentences of T . Deductively closed
extensions of T correspond to filters of LT (see ref. [4] for details).
Let 〈n〉T be a Πn+1-formula that formalizes the notion of n-consistency in arithmetic. The
graded provability algebra MT of T is the algebra LT extended by operators 〈n〉T defined on the
elements of LT by
〈n〉T : {ϕ} 7−→ {〈n〉Tϕ}, for n ≥ 0.
Terms in the language ofMT can be identified with polymodal formulas. Furthermore, for each
sound and axiomatizable extension T of PA, Japaridze’s arithmetical completeness theorem for
GLP states that
GLP ⊢ ϕ(~p) ⇐⇒ MT |= ∀~p (ϕ(~p) = ⊤),
where ~p are all the propositional variables from ϕ(~p). The algebra MT carries an additional
structure in form of a distinguished family of subsets
P0 ⊂ P1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ MT ,
where Pn is defined by the class of Πn+1-sentences of the arithmetical hierarchy. This family of
subsets is called stratification of MT [3]. Since 〈n〉T is a Πn+1-formula, the operator 〈n〉T maps
MT to Pn. The presence of a stratification admits to turn MT into a many-sorted algebra—
variables of sort n range over arithmetical Πn+1-sentences. The notion of sort can be naturally
extended to capture polymodal terms. It is the goal of this paper to investigate a modal-logical
counterpart to this many-sorted algebra.
To this end, we define a many-sorted variant of GLP, denoted by GLP∗, which has variables of
sort n, for every n ≥ 0. Substitution in this logic is required to respect the sorts of variables. Our
main result is a Solovay-style arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP∗, i.e., for any sound
and axiomatizable extension T of PA we have
GLP
∗ ⊢ ϕ(~p) ⇐⇒ MT |= ∀~p (ϕ(~p) = ⊤),
where ~p are all propositional variables from ϕ(~p) and a quantifier binding such a variable of
sort n only ranges over elements from Pn. In particular, we show that the principle of Σn+1-
completeness,
〈n〉T p→ p
(where p is of sort n), in addition to the postulates of GLP, suffices to obtain arithmetical
completeness. A logic that contains this principle has been studied by Visser [18] who introduced
a Σ1-provability logic of PA, i.e., in this logic, variables are arithmetically interpreted as Σ1-
sentences (see also Boolos [12] and Ardeshir and Mojtahedi [1]).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this introductory section, we
introduce basic notions in Section 2. In Section 3 we prove the arithmetical completeness theorem
for GLP∗. We continue our exposition with some further results in Section 4 and conclude the
paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
The Logics GLP, GLP∗, and J∗. The polymodal provability logic GLP is formulated in
the language of the propositional calculus enriched by unary connectives 〈0〉, 〈1〉, 〈2〉, . . ., called
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modalities. The dual connectives [n], for every n ≥ 0, are abbreviations where [n]ϕ stands for
¬〈n〉¬ϕ. The notion of a formula is defined in the usual way. The logic GLP is axiomatized by
the following axiom schemes and rules:1
(i) all tautologies of classical propositional logic;
(ii) 〈n〉(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ 〈n〉ϕ ∨ 〈n〉ψ; [n]⊤;
(iii) 〈n〉ϕ→ 〈n〉(ϕ ∧ 〈n〉¬ϕ) (Löb’s axiom);
(iv) 〈m〉ϕ→ [n]〈m〉ϕ, for m < n;
(v) 〈n〉ϕ→ 〈m〉ϕ, for m < n (monotonicity); and
(vi) modus ponens and ϕ→ ψ/〈n〉ϕ→ 〈n〉ψ.
GLP
∗ is formulated over a propositional language that contains variables each being assigned a
unique sort α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ ω. By writing pα, we indicate that the variable pα has sort α.
The notion of sort is defined for all formulas as follows:
(i) ⊤ and ⊥ have sort 0;
(ii) ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ∨ ψ have sort max{α, β} if ϕ and ψ have the respective sorts α and β;
(iii) ¬ϕ has sort α+ 1 if ϕ has sort α; and
(iv) 〈n〉ϕ has sort n, for n < ω.
We denote by |ϕ| the sort of ϕ. The sort ω is explicitly included to provide variables that can
explicitly be assigned an arbitrary arithmetical sentence in an arithmetical interpretation. In
contrast, variables of finite n < ω can be assigned arithmetical Πn+1-sentences (see below). Note
that if |¬ϕ| = α, then α is a successor ordinal.
The logic GLP∗ is now axiomatized by the following axiom schemes and rules of inference:
(i) all tautologies of classical propositional logic;
(ii) schemes (i), (ii), (iii), and (v) of GLP;
(iii) 〈n〉ϕ→ ϕ, if |ϕ| ≤ n (Σn+1-completeness).
Note that, for m < n, GLP∗ ⊢ 〈n〉¬〈m〉ϕ → ¬〈m〉ϕ, whence GLP∗ ⊢ 〈m〉ϕ → [n]〈m〉ϕ follows
by propositional logic. Hence, GLP∗ extends GLP in the sense that, for any formula ϕ in the
language of GLP, if GLP ⊢ ϕ, then GLP∗ ⊢ ϕ′, where ϕ′ is obtained from ϕ by arbitrarily assigning
sorts to propositional variables.
The logic GLP is not complete for any class of Kripke frames [14]. Therefore, Beklemishev [6]
considers a weaker logic J that is complete with respect to a natural class of Kripke frame and
to which GLP is reducible. We do so as well and define a many-sorted counterpart J∗ of J which
arises from GLP∗ by dropping monotonicity and adding the scheme
(vii) 〈m〉〈n〉ϕ→ 〈m〉ϕ, for m < n.
It is easy to see that this scheme is provable in GLP∗, i.e., GLP∗ extends J∗.
1Usually, GLP is axiomatized by using [n] instead of 〈n〉. However, it is more convenient for our purposes to
use 〈n〉, since we focus on Πn+1-axiomatized concepts. Note that GLP is closed under the necessitation rule: if
GLP ⊢ ϕ then GLP ⊢ [n]ϕ.
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Kripke Models. A Kripke frame is a structure A = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0〉, where W is a non-empty
set of worlds and Rk, for k ≥ 0, are binary relations on W . A is called finite if W is finite and
Rk = ∅ for almost every k ≥ 0.
A valuation J·K on a frame A maps every propositional variable p to a subset JpK ⊆ W .
A Kripke model is a Kripke frame together with a valuation on it. Given any Kripke model
A = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0, J·K〉, we extend the valuation J·K recursively to the class of all polymodal
formulas:
(i) J⊤K =W ; J⊥K = ∅;
(ii) Jψ ∧ χK = JψK ∩ JχK;
(iii) J¬ψK =W \ JψK, and similarly for the other propositional connectives; and
(iv) J〈n〉ψK = {x ∈ W | ∃y (xRny & y ∈ JψK)}.
We often write A, x |= ϕ instead of x ∈ JϕK. Similarly, we also write x  ϕ instead of x ∈ JϕK
when A is clear from the context. We say that ϕ is valid in A, denoted by A |= ϕ, if A, x |= ϕ
for every x ∈W .
A binary relation R on W is conversely well-founded if there is no infinite chain of elements
of W of the form x0Rx1Rx2 . . .. It is easy to see that, for finite W , this condition is equivalent
to R being irreflexive. A Kripke frame A = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0〉 is called a J
∗-frame if
(i) Rk is conversely well-founded and transitive, for all k ≥ 0;
(ii) ∀x, y (xRny ⇒ ∀z (xRmz ⇔ yRmz)), for m < n; and
(iii) ∀x, y, z (xRmy & yRnz ⇒ xRmz), for m < n.
A J∗-model is a Kripke model that is based on a J∗-frame. Such a model A = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0, J·K〉
is called strongly persistent if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) if |p| ≤ n and y  p, then x  p whenever xRny; and
(ii) if |p| < n and y 1 p, then x 1 p whenever xRny.
The following facts are easy to establish.
Lemma 2.1. Let A = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0, J·K〉 be a J
∗-model. Then, A is strongly persistent iff for all
formulas ϕ and all n ≥ 0 we have
(i) if |ϕ| ≤ n, then xRny and y  ϕ imply x  ϕ; and
(ii) if |ϕ| < n, then xRny and y 1 ϕ imply x 1 ϕ.
Lemma 2.2. The axiom scheme 〈n〉ϕ→ ϕ is valid in a J∗-model A for all ϕ such that |ϕ| ≤ n
iff A is strongly persistent.
Theorem 2.3. For any formula ϕ, J∗ ⊢ ϕ iff ϕ is valid in all finite, strongly persistent J∗-models.
Proof (Sketch). The soundness direction is a straightforward induction on proof length. For
completeness, the standard methods used to construct canonical Kripke models can be used to
show that J∗ is complete for the class of finite and strongly persistent J∗-models. Roughly, the
argument can be sketched as follows.
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We define an operator ∼, called modified negation, for all formulas ϕ as follows:
∼ϕ =
{
ψ, if ϕ = ¬ψ for some ψ,
¬ϕ, otherwise.
For a set ∆ of formulas, we define ℓ(∆) := {n | 〈n〉ϕ ∈ ∆ for some ϕ}. Following [6], we say that
a set ∆ of formulas is adequate if ⊤ ∈ ∆ and it is closed under subformulas, modified negations,
and the operations
〈n〉ϕ, 〈m〉ψ ∈ ∆ ⇒ 〈m〉ϕ ∈ ∆,
pm ∈ ∆, n ∈ ℓ(∆) ⇒ 〈n〉pm ∈ ∆, for all variables pm and n ≥ m, and
¬pm ∈ ∆, n ∈ ℓ(∆) ⇒ 〈n〉¬pm ∈ ∆, for all variables pm and n > m.
We can easily convince ourselves that any finite set Γ can be extended to a finite set Γ′ which is
adequate and such that ℓ(Γ) = ℓ(Γ′).
Let us now fix a finite adequate set ∆ and assume that all modalities range within Λ := ℓ(∆).
Define a Kripke frame F∆ = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0〉, where
W := {x | x is a maximal J∗-consistent subset of ∆},
for n ∈ Λ and x, y ∈ W , and xRny holds if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) For any ϕ ∈ y, if 〈n〉ϕ ∈ ∆ then 〈n〉ϕ ∈ x.
(ii) For any 〈n〉ϕ ∈ ∆, we have that 〈n〉ϕ ∈ y implies 〈n〉ϕ ∈ x.
(iii) For any 〈m〉ϕ ∈ ∆ such that m < n, we have 〈m〉ϕ ∈ x ⇐⇒ 〈m〉ϕ ∈ y.
(iv) There exists a formula 〈n〉ϕ ∈ ∆ such that 〈n〉ϕ ∈ x \ y.
For any natural number n 6∈ Λ, set Rn := ∅. Furthermore, define a Kripke model A∆ = 〈F∆, J·K〉,
where
A∆, x |= p ⇐⇒df p ∈ x
for all variables p ∈ ∆ and x ∈W . It can be shown that, for all ϕ ∈ ∆,
A∆, x |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ x.
Moreover, using the axioms of Σn-completeness, A∆ can be easily shown to be a finite and
strongly persistent J∗-model.
Using these facts, completeness follows in the usual way. Suppose J∗ 0 ϕ. Then {∼ϕ} is
J∗-consistent. Let ∆ be the smallest finite adequate set containing ϕ. Then A∆ is a finite and
strongly persistent J∗-model. There is a maximal J∗-consistent set x ⊆ ∆ such that ∼ϕ ∈ x,
whence K∆, x 6|= ϕ.
2

Formal Arithmetic. We consider first-order theories in the language L0 = (0,+, ·, s) of arith-
metic (where s is a unary function symbol for the successor function). Theories and formulas
formulated in (an extension of) this language will be called arithmetical. The theories we consider
will be extensions of Peano arithmetic (PA). It will be convenient to assume that the language
2A detailed proof can be found in the work of Berger [11].
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of PA contains terms for all primitive recursive functions. It is well-known that PA can be con-
servatively extended so as to contain definitions of all these terms. The class of ∆0-formulas are
all formulas where each occurrence of a quantifier is of either forms
∀x ≤ t ϕ := ∀x (x ≤ t→ ϕ),
∃x ≤ t ϕ := ∃x (x ≤ t ∧ ϕ),
where t is a term over L0 that has no occurrence of the variable x. Occurrences of such quantifiers
are called bounded. The classes of Σn- and Πn-formulas are defined inductively: ∆0-formulas are
Σ0- and Π0-formulas. If ϕ(~x, y) is a Πn-formula, then ∃y ϕ(~x, y) is a Σn+1-formula. Similarly,
if ϕ(~x, y) is a Σn-formula, then ∀y ϕ(~x, y) is a Πn+1-formula. When an arithmetical theory T is
given, we often identify these classes modulo provable equivalence in T .
We recursively define 0 := 0 and n+ 1 := s(n). The expression n is called the n-th numeral
and represents the number n in L0. We assume a standard global assignment p·q of expressions
(terms, formulas, etc.) to natural numbers. Given any expression τ , we call pτq the code or Gödel
number of τ . Note that pτq, being a natural number, “lives” in our informal metatheory and
has a natural representation in L0 through the term pτq. However, when presenting formulas
in the arithmetical language, we usually write pτq instead of pτq. We often consider primitive
recursive families of formulas ϕn that depend on a parameter n ∈ ω. In this context, pϕxq
denotes a primitive recursive definable term with free variable x whose value for a given n is the
Gödel number of ϕn. In particular, the expression pϕ(x˙)q denotes a primitive recursive definable
term whose value given any n is the Gödel number of ϕ(n), i.e., the Gödel number of the formula
resulting from ϕ when substituting the term n for x. Following [7], it is convenient to assume
a second sort of first-order variables, denoted α, β, . . ., that range over codes of arithmetical
formulas. Formulas containing such variables can be naturally translated into the one-sorted
setting by making use of a primitive recursive predicate that defines the notion of “being a
formula.”
A theory T is sound if T ⊢ ϕ implies N |= ϕ, for every arithmetical sentence ϕ. For an
axiomatizable extension T of PA, we denote by ✷T (α) the formula that formalizes the notion of
provability in T in the usual sense. We write ✷Tϕ instead of ✷T (pϕq). The formula ✷T defines
the standard Gödelian provability predicate for T . More generally, given a formula Prv(α) with
one free variable α, we say that Prv is a provability predicate of level n over T , if for all arithmetical
sentences ϕ, ψ:
(i) Prv is a Σn+1-formula;
(ii) T ⊢ ϕ implies PA ⊢ Prv(pϕq);
(iii) PA ⊢ Prv(pϕ→ ψq)→ (Prv(pϕq)→ Prv(pψq)); and
(iv) if ϕ is a Σn+1-sentence, then PA ⊢ ϕ→ Prv(pϕq).
It is well-known that ✷T , in its standard formulation, is a provability predicate of level 0. A
provability predicate Prv is sound if N |= Prv(pϕq) implies N |= ϕ, for every arithmetical sentence
ϕ. A sequence π of formulas Prv0,Prv1, . . . is a strong sequence of provability predicates over T
if there is a sequence r0 < r1 < · · · of natural numbers such that, for all n ≥ 0,
(i) Prvn is a provability predicate of level rn over T ; and
(ii) T ⊢ Prvn(pϕq)→ Prvn+1(pϕq), for any arithmetical sentence ϕ.
We denote Prvn by [n]pi and abbreviate [n]pi(pϕq) by [n]piϕ. Moreover, the dual of [n]pi is defined
by 〈n〉piϕ := ¬[n]pi¬ϕ. Given such a sequence π, we denote by |πn| the level of the n-th provability
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predicate of π.
Since provability predicate [n]pi from π is a Σk-sentence for some k > 0, we can associate (in
analogy to the standard Gödelian provability predicate) a predicate Prfn(α, y) which expresses
the statement “y codes a proof of α” and
T ⊢ Prvn(α)↔ ∃y Prfn(α, y).
We stress that Prfn is chosen in such a way such that every number y codes a proof of at most
one formula and that every provable formula has arbitrarily long proofs.
We denote by TrueΠn(α) the well-known truth-definition for the class of all Πn-sentences, i.e.,
TrueΠn(α) expresses the fact “α is the Gödel number of a true arithmetical Πn-sentence.” The
truth-definition for Πn-sentences serves as a basis for a natural strong sequence of provability
predicates. Let [0]T := ✷T and
[n+ 1]T (α) := ∃β (TrueΠn(β) ∧✷T (β → α)), for n ≥ 0.
The formula [n]T is a provability predicate of level n. It formalizes the notion of being provable
in the theory T + ThΠn(N), where ThΠn(N) is the set of all true Πn-sentences.
Another strong sequence of provability predicates is defined by [0]ω := ✷PA and
[n+ 1]ω := ∃β (∀x [n]ωβ(x˙) ∧ [n]ω(∀xβ(x)→ α)), for n ≥ 0.
The predicate [n]ω is of level 2n and formalizes the notion of provability by n applications of the ω-
rule. Japardize originally showed arithmetical completeness for this arithmetical interpretation,
while completeness with respect to the broader class of arithmetical interpretations, defined by
strong sequences of provability predicates, was later established by Ignatiev [14].3
Arithmetical Interpretation. Let π be a strong sequence of provability predicates over T .
An (arithmetical) realization (over π) is a function fpi that maps propositional variables to
arithmetical sentences. The realization fpi is typed if fpi(p) is an arithmetical Π|pin|+1-sentence,
provided n = |p| < ω. Any realization fpi can be uniquely extended to a map fˆpi that captures
all polymodal formulas as follows:
(i) fˆpi(⊥) = ⊥; fˆpi(⊤) = ⊤, where ⊥ (resp., ⊤) is a convenient contradictory (resp., tauto-
logical) statement in the language of arithmetic;
(ii) fˆpi(p) = fpi(p), for any propositional variable p;
(iii) fˆpi(·) commutes with the propositional connectives; and
(iv) fˆpi(〈n〉ϕ) = 〈n〉pi fˆpi(ϕ), for all n ≥ 0.
By some simple closure properties of the class of Πn-sentences, its follows that |ϕ| = n implies
that fˆpi(ϕ) is provably equivalent to a Π|pin|+1-sentence in T . Using this, we readily observe:
Lemma 2.4. If GLP∗ ⊢ ϕ, then T ⊢ fˆpi(ϕ) for all typed arithmetical realizations fpi over π.
Proof. The lemma is shown by induction on the length of a proof of ϕ in GLP∗. Most of the
axioms are clear. In particular, the provability of the instances Löb’s axiom is well-known. The
axiom of Σn+1-completeness follows from our discussion above. The induction step, i.e., closure
under the rules of inference, is easy to establish. We leave the details to the reader. 
3See Artemov and Beklemishev [2] for a brief historical background.
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Hence, GLP∗ is sound for the arithmetical semantics thus defined. Completeness holds under
the additional assumption of soundness of the provability predicates involved. Arithmetical
completeness for GLP∗ has first been established by Japaridze [15] and has been significantly
extended and simplified by Ignatiev [14]. Beklemishev [7] provided yet another simplified proof
for the arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP∗ that is close to Solovay’s original construction
for the logic GL. The next section will be devoted to the proof of the arithmetical completeness
theorem for GLP∗. To this end, we are going to extend the construction for GLP described in
ref. [7].
3 Arithmetical Completeness
Arithmetical completeness proofs usually rely on reasonable Kripke semantics, since those proofs
usually establish the following fact: if ϕ is a formula that has a Kripke model falsifying ϕ in a
certain world, one can find an arithmetical realization such that the arithmetical theory under
consideration does not prove ϕ under this realization. Since GLP is, however, not complete for
any class of Kripke frames, Beklemishev reduces GLP to J and relies on the Kripke semantics of
J in order to prove arithmetical completeness. We proceed analogously in the following.
To this end, we define formulas M(ϕ) and M+(ϕ) as follows [7]. Consider an enumeration
〈m1〉ϕ1, 〈m2〉ϕ2, . . . , 〈ms〉ϕs of all subformulas of ϕ of the form 〈k〉ψ and let n := maxi≤smi.
Define
M(ϕ) :=
∧
1≤i≤s
mi<j≤n
(〈j〉ϕi → 〈mi〉ϕi),
and, furthermore,
M+(ϕ) :=M(ϕ) ∧
∧
i≤n
[i]M(ϕ).
By the monotonicity axioms, it is clear that GLP∗ ⊢M+(ϕ). We are going to prove the following
statement.
Theorem 3.1. Let T be a sound axiomatizable extension of PA and π a strong sequence of
provability predicates over T of which every provability predicate is sound. Then, for all many-
sorted formulas ϕ, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) GLP∗ ⊢ ϕ;
(ii) J∗ ⊢M+(ϕ)→ ϕ; and
(iii) T ⊢ fˆpi(ϕ), for all typed realizations fpi.
Before turning to the proof of this theorem, let us introduce some additional notions. A root of
a J∗-model A = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0, J·K〉 is a world r ∈ W such that for all x ∈ W there is a k ≥ 0
such that rRkx or r = x. A model which has a root is called rooted. The following lemma can
be proved similarly as in ref. [7].
Lemma 3.2. For any ϕ ∈ L∗, if J∗ 0 ϕ then there is a finite and strongly persistent J∗-model
A with root r such that A, r 6|= ϕ.
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.1. The direction from (ii) to (i) is immediate since GLP∗
extends J∗ and GLP∗ ⊢ M+(ϕ). Furthermore, the direction from (i) to (iii) is the arithmetical
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soundness of GLP∗ (Lemma 2.4). We show that (iii) implies (ii) by assuming the contrapositive,
i.e., assume that J∗ 0 M+(ϕ) → ϕ. Then there is a finite and strongly persistent J∗-model
A = 〈W, {R′n}n≥0, J·K〉 with root r such that A, r |= M
+(ϕ) and A, r 6|= ϕ. Without loss of
generality, assume that W = {1, 2, . . . , N} for some N ≥ 1 and r = 1. We define a new model
A0 = 〈W0, {Rn}n≥0, J·K〉, where
(i) W0 = {0} ∪W ;
(ii) R0 = {(0, x) | x ∈W} ∪R
′
0;
(iii) Rk = R
′
k, for k > 0; and
(iv) A0, 0 |= p ⇐⇒df A, 1 |= p, for all variables p.
Notice that A0 is still a finite and strongly persistent J
∗-model such that A0, r 6|= M
+(ϕ) → ϕ.
Let m be the least number such that Rm 6= ∅ and Rk = ∅ for all k > m. As in ref. [7], we define
the following auxiliary notions:
Rk(x) := {y | xRky},
R∗k(x) := {y | y ∈ Ri(x), for some i ≥ k}, and
R◦k(x) := R
∗
k(x) ∪
⋃
{R∗k(z) | x ∈ R
∗
k+1(z)}.
Furthermore, Solovay functions hn : ω →W0 are defined for all n ≤ m as follows:
h0(0) = 0 and hn(0) = ℓn−1, for n > 0;
hn(x+ 1) =
{
y, if hn(x)Rnz and Prfn(p¬Szq, x),
hn(x), otherwise.
Here, ℓk = x is a formalization of the statement that the function hk (defined by a formula
Hk(x, y)) has as its limit at x, i.e.,
ℓk = x ⇐⇒df ∃N0 ∀n ≥ N0Hk(n, x).
The defining formulas Hk can be constructed via a diagonalization argument; see [7] for details.
For x ∈W0, Sx denotes the sentence ℓm = x. The following lemmas are established in ref. [7].
Lemma 3.3. For all k ≥ 0,
(i) T ⊢ ∀x∃!w ∈W0 : Hk(x,w);
(ii) T ⊢ ∃!w ∈W0 : ℓk = w;
(iii) T ⊢ ∀i, j ∀z ∈ W0 (i < j ∧ hk(i) = z → hk(j) ∈ Rk(z) ∪ {z}); and
(iv) T ⊢ ∀z ∈W0 (∃xhk(x) = z → ℓm ∈ R
∗
k(z) ∪ {z}).
Lemma 3.4. The following conditions hold for the sentences Sx:
(i) T ⊢
∨
x∈W0
Sx and T ⊢ ¬(Sx ∧ Sy) for all x 6= y;
(ii) T ⊢ Sx → 〈k〉piSy, for all y such that xRky;
(iii) T ⊢ Sx → [k]pi(ℓm ∈ R
◦
k(x)), for all x 6= 0; and
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(iv) N |= S0.
Lemma 3.5. For all k < m, provably in T ,
(i) either ℓk = ℓk+1 or ℓkRk+1ℓk+1; and
(ii) if k < n ≤ m, then either ℓk = ℓn or ℓkRjℓn, for some j ∈ (k, n].
Proof. Item (i) is clear from Lemma 3.3. Item (ii) is proved by an external induction on n
from (i). 
Lemma 3.6. For the arithmetical realization fpi defined by
fpi : p 7−→
∨
x p
Sx
it holds that T 0 fˆpi(ϕ).
Proof (Sketch). Lemma 3.6 can be proved by first establishing Solovay’s “commutation lemma”
which says that, for each world x 6= 0 and each subformula χ of ϕ, it holds that
(i) if A0, x |= χ, then T ⊢ Sx → fˆpi(χ); and
(ii) if A0, x 6|= χ, then T ⊢ Sx → ¬fˆpi(χ).
Indeed, now suppose that T ⊢ fˆpi(ϕ). Then A, 1 6|= ϕ implies that T ⊢ S1 → ¬fˆpi(ϕ). Hence, T ⊢
¬S1 and so T ⊢ ¬〈0〉piS1, whence T ⊢ ¬S0 by item (ii) of Lemma 3.4. This contradicts item (iv)
of Lemma 3.4. 
It therefore suffices to show that fpi is a typed arithmetical realization using the assumption that
A0 is a strongly persistent J
∗-model. To this end, we assume a natural arithmetization of the
forcing relation  on A0 by bounded formulas.
Lemma 3.7. For any variable p of sort k ≤ m, provably in T ,
fpi(p) ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈W0 \ JpK : ∀x¬Hk(x,w).
Proof. For the direction from left to right, we reason in T as follows. Assume fpi(p) and, towards
a contradiction, suppose that ∃xhk(x) = w for some w ∈ W0 such that w 1 p. By item (iv)
of Lemma 3.3, we know that, provably in T , ∃xhk(x) = u implies
Su ∨
∨
z∈R∗
k
(u)
Sz,
for any u ∈W0. In particular, we infer
Sw ∨
∨
u∈R∗
k
(w)
Su.
Since A0 is strongly persistent and w 1 p, we know that u 1 p for all u ∈ R
∗
k(w). This contradicts
fpi(p) by item (i) of Lemma 3.4.
For the other direction, we reason in T as follows. Assume the right-hand side of the equiv-
alence. We certainly know that ¬Su for all u ∈ W0 such that u 1 p. Now, if ℓk = ℓm, then,
by item (i) of Lemma 3.4, Sx for some x ∈ W0 such that x  p and we are thus finished. So
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suppose that ℓk 6= ℓm. We know that ℓk  p, since ∀xhk(x) 6= w for all w  ¬p. Assume
now that ℓm  ¬p. By Lemma 3.5, there must be a j ∈ (k,m] such that ℓkRjℓm. By strong
persistence, for any x, y ∈ W0 such that xRjy, it holds that
y 1 p =⇒ x 1 p.
Thus, ℓm  ¬p is impossible and therefore ℓm  p by item (i) of Lemma 3.4. 
Lemma 3.8. For every variable pk, where k < ω, fpi(p
k) is Π|pik|+1 in T .
Proof. Note that Hk(x, y) can be defined ∆|pik|+1 in T , since Prfk is Π|pik| in T and, moreover,
T ⊢ ∀x∃y!Hk(x, y). Now, if k > m then the sentence fpi(p
k) is a disjunction of sentences which
are Σ|pik|+2 in T . Since T ⊢ ∃!w ∈W0 : ℓm = w (item (i) of Lemma 3.4) we know that, provably
in T ,
fpi(p
k) ⇐⇒
∨
x p
Sx ⇐⇒
∧
x1 p
¬Sx,
i.e., fpi(p
k) is Π|pik|+2 in T as required, since it is provably equivalent to a conjunction of sentences
which are Π|pik|+2 in T .
If k ≤ m, then by Lemma 3.7 we know that, provably in T ,
fpi(p) ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈W0 \ JpK : ∀x¬Hk(x,w),
which is visibly Π|pik|+1 in T . 
Therefore, fpi defines a typed arithmetical realization as desired. This completes the proof of
Theorem 3.1.
4 Further Results
In this section, we briefly comment on some additional results concerning GLP∗. For a detailed
exposition, we refer the interested reader to Berger [11].
Truth Provability Logic. By the truth provability logic GLPS we understand the set of all
modal formulas in the language of GLP that are true in the standard model of arithmetic un-
der every arithmetical realization (see ref. Beklemishev [7], Ignatiev [14], Japaridze [15]). The
methods above can be easily extended to characterize a many-sorted analogue of GLPS, which
we denote by GLPS∗. More precisely, let GLPS∗ denote the logic consisting of the set of theorems
of GLP∗ extended by the schema ϕ → 〈n〉ϕ (n ≥ 0) and with modus ponens as its sole rule of
inference. Let 〈n1〉ϕ1, . . . , 〈ns〉ϕs be an enumeration of all subformulas from ϕ of the form 〈k〉ψ.
Let
H(ϕ) :=
s∧
i=1
(ϕi → 〈ni〉ϕi).
The following theorem can be proved as in ref. [7].
Theorem 4.1. Let T be a sound axiomatizable extension of PA and π a strong sequence of
provability predicates over T of which every provability predicate is sound. Then, for all many-
sorted formulas ϕ, the following statements are equivalent:
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(i) GLPS∗ ⊢ ϕ;
(ii) GLP∗ ⊢ H(ϕ)→ ϕ; and
(iii) N |= fˆpi(ϕ), for all typed realizations fpi.
Reduction of GLP∗ to GLP. Note that Theorem 3.1 yields a reduction from GLP∗ to J∗.
However, the formula M+(ϕ) is, in a sense, inconvenient since its size does not depend on
the size of ϕ and, additionally, M+(ϕ) is not necessarily in the language of ϕ. We borrow a
result from [10] to improve upon that. Let 〈m1〉ϕ1, 〈m2〉ϕ2, . . . , 〈ms〉ϕs be an enumeration of all
subformulas of ϕ of the form 〈k〉ψ such that i < j implies mi ≤ mj . Define
N(ϕ) :=
∧
1≤i≤s
i<j≤s
(〈mj〉ϕj → 〈mi〉ϕi).
Furthermore, let
N+(ϕ) := N(ϕ) ∧
∧
1≤i≤s
[mi]ϕ.
Lemma 4.2. For all formulas ϕ,
GLP
∗ ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ J∗ ⊢ N+(ϕ)→ ϕ.
Proof. The direction from right to left is immediate, since GLP∗ ⊢ N+(ϕ). For the other direc-
tion, suppose that J∗ 0 N+(ϕ) → ϕ. Then there is a finite and strongly persistent J∗-model
A = 〈W, {Rn}n≥0, J·K〉 with root r such that A, r |= N
+(ϕ) and A, r 6|= ϕ. Modify A by stip-
ulating that Rk = ∅ for all natural numbers k such that 〈k〉 does not occur in ϕ. It is clear
that A, r |= N+(ϕ) → ϕ, since N+(ϕ) contains the same modalities as ϕ. We show that
A, r |= M+(ϕ). Let i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and consider any j such that mi < j ≤ n. Now A, r |= 〈j〉ϕi
only if j = mk for some k = 1, . . . , s. In this case, A, r |= 〈mi〉ϕ since A, r |= N
+(ϕ). Otherwise,
if j 6= mk for all k = 1, . . . , s, then trivially A, r |= 〈j〉ϕi → 〈mi〉ϕi, since A, r 6|= 〈j〉ϕi due
to the fact that Rj = ∅. Let n := maxi≤smi and consider any i ≤ n. Similarly as before,
A, r |= [i]M(ϕ) if i = mk for some k = 1, . . . , s. If not, then trivially A, r |= [i]M(ϕ). Hence,
A, r |=M+(ϕ) and so J∗ 0M+(ϕ)→ ϕ, whence GLP∗ 0 ϕ follows. 
Let ϕ be a formula from L∗ and let p1, . . . , pk exhaust all variables from ϕ and let α1, . . . , αk be
their respective sorts. Furthermore, let Θ ⊆ ω be a set of modalities. Define
RΘ(ϕ) :=
k∧
i=1
∧
({〈j〉pi → pi | j ∈ Θ, j ≥ αi} ∪ {〈j〉¬pi → ¬pi | j ∈ Θ, j > αi})
and
R+Θ(ϕ) := RΘ(ϕ) ∧
∧
j∈Θ
[j]RΘ(ϕ).
In the following, if we claim that a one-sorted logic (like GLP) proves a many-sorted formula, we
mean that the one-sorted logic proves the formula which results from the many-sorted one if we
simply disregard the sorts.
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Lemma 4.3. Let ϕ be a many-sorted formula and let Θ be the set of all modalities occurring in
ϕ. Then,
GLP
∗ ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ GLP ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ)→ ϕ.
Proof. The direction from right to left is immediate since GLP∗ ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ) and GLP
∗ extends GLP.
For the other direction, suppose GLP 0 R+Θ(ϕ) → ϕ. It follows from results of [7] together with
a result of [10] that this implies
J 0 N+(R+Θ(ϕ)→ ϕ)→ (R
+
Θ(ϕ)→ ϕ). (1)
Recall that J is complete with respect to the class of all J∗-models (there called J-models). So
let A = 〈W, {Rα}α<ω, J·K〉 be a J
∗-model with root r such that
A, r 6|= N+(R+Θ(ϕ)→ ϕ)→ (R
+
Θ(ϕ)→ ϕ).
Therefore, A, r |= N+(R+Θ(ϕ) → ϕ) and A, r |= R
+
Θ(ϕ), but A, r 6|= ϕ. Now it follows that
A, r |= N+(ϕ) by definition of N+(·). Since A, r |= R+Θ(ϕ) and A is rooted, it is easy to see that
A is strongly persistent by the construction of R+Θ(ϕ). (Notice that A can be chosen such that
Rα = ∅ for all α 6∈ Θ, since the formula depicted in (1) is in the language of ϕ.) Therefore,
J∗ 0 N+(ϕ)→ ϕ and so GLP∗ 0 ϕ follows. 
We say that a logic L has the Craig interpolation property if, whenever L ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then there
is an η containing only variables which are present in ϕ and ψ such that both L ⊢ ϕ → η and
L ⊢ η → ψ.
Corollary 4.4. GLP∗ has the Craig interpolation property.
Proof. Suppose GLP∗ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ. Let Θ be the set of all modalities from ϕ→ ψ. By Lemma 4.3,
we have
GLP ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ).
Note that R+Θ(ϕ→ ψ) is equivalent in GLP to R
+
Θ(ϕ) ∧R
+
Θ(ψ). Hence,
GLP ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ) ∧R
+
Θ(ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ),
whence by propositional logic
GLP ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ) ∧ ϕ→ (R
+
Θ(ψ)→ ψ).
Ignatiev [14] showed that GLP has the Craig interpolation property. Hence, there is an η con-
taining only variables which occur in R+Θ(ϕ) ∧ ϕ and R
+
Θ(ψ)→ ψ such that
GLP ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ) ∧ ϕ→ η and GLP ⊢ η → (R
+
Θ(ψ)→ ψ).
But GLP∗ ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ) and GLP
∗ ⊢ R+Θ(ψ). Therefore, GLP
∗ ⊢ ϕ → η and GLP∗ ⊢ η → ψ. Note
that η only contains variables which occur in ϕ and ψ, since R+Θ(τ) contains exactly the variables
from τ , for any formula τ . 
Corollary 4.5. Deciding whether GLP∗ ⊢ ϕ is complete for PSpace.
Proof. Shapirovsky [17] showed that deciding whether GLP ⊢ ϕ is complete for PSpace. For
membership, in order to check whether GLP∗ ⊢ ϕ, it suffices to check whether GLP ⊢ R+Θ(ϕ)→ ϕ,
where Θ denotes the set of modalities from ϕ. Note that R+Θ(ϕ) is polynomial in the size of ϕ.
For hardness, reduce the task of checking whether GLP ⊢ ϕ as follows. Let ϕ′ be a many-sorted
formula that results from ϕ by assigning the sort ω to all propositional variables. It is easy to see
that GLP ⊢ ϕ iff GLP∗ ⊢ ϕ′ by the arithmetical completeness theorems for GLP and GLP∗. 
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5 Conclusion
We have introduced a many-sorted variant, denoted GLP∗, of Japaridze’s polymodal logic GLP.
GLP
∗ is arithmetically sound and complete with respect to a broad class of arithmetical inter-
pretations, where variables of sort below ω are interpreted as Πn-sentences from the arithmetical
hierarchy. GLP has attracted a lot of interest in the mathematical logic community due to its
proof-theoretic applications. It was noticed [8, 13] that the proof-theoretic analysis of PA due
to Beklemishev [3] uses only a positive fragment of GLP that consists of formulas built up from
∧, ⊤, and 〈n〉. Dashkov [13] axiomatized this fragment by a positive calculus and showed that
theoremhood in this calculus is decidable in polynomial time. Moreover, such positive calculi ad-
mit a richer arithmetical interpretation than full GLP: variables can be interpreted as (primitive
recursive enumerations of) possibly infinite theories rather than single sentences. The conjunc-
tion of two positive formulas is then interpreted as the union of the corresponding theories. Its
richer arithmetical interpretation allows for the introduction of an additional modality 〈ω〉 that is
arithmetically interpreted as the full uniform reflection principle (cf. [4, 16]). This principle has
no finite, yet a recursive axiomatization. Consequently, it is possible to include the correspond-
ing modality in the positive calculus. This line of research was followed by Beklemishev [9] who
provided arithmetical completeness results for a positive calculus containing such a modality in
its language. These calculi (called reflection calculi) can be brought into the many-sorted setting
as well: variables of sort n are interpreted as Πn+1-axiomatizable extensions of PA, while those of
sort ω are interpreted as arbitrary ones. Arithmetical completeness results can then be obtained
in a similar fashion as presented in this work. We refer the reader to [11] for details.
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